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Abstract 
In this paper I argue that the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework is unlikely 
to have a significant impact on procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines by developing 
states during the next pandemic. I argue this on the basis that the vaccine stockpile that the 
Framework has created is not sufficiently large to meet the demand from developing states. I 
also argue that the fact that so few pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers have commit-
ted to supply the PIP stockpile, and those that have, have given commitments lower than 
those initially proposed by the WHO in the Framework, implies that the overall impact the 
PIP stockpile will have on procurement of PIV is even lower than initially anticipated within 
the literature. 
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Introduction
Prior to the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework being enacted by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) in 2011, a considerable amount of discussion on access to pan-
demic influenza vaccines had centred on the fact that samples of the virus used to produce a 
pandemic influenza vaccine (henceforward PIV) were likely to have been supplied by devel-
oping states, which then struggled to purchase the resulting vaccine.  Indeed, a major impetus 1
for the creation of the Framework was the 2005-H5N1 virus sharing incident, during which 
Indonesia departed from the established norm of sharing pandemic influenza samples with 
the WHO,  claiming that the samples were the sovereign property of the State of Indonesia, 2
and they were under no obligation to share them with the wider international community.  3
The Indonesian Government cited an unfair lack of correlation between sharing samples and 
the benefits obtained in return as the primary reason for refusing to share samples.  This ar4 -
gument certainly has merit: an influenza pandemic is characterised by large inequalities be-
tween developed and developing states. During the 2009-H1N1 pandemic, there were signifi-
cant disparities in vaccination coverage between developed and developing states: developed 
states were able to procure more vaccine, and procure it earlier in the pandemic, than devel-
oping states.  Since 2009-H1N1 global manufacturing capacity for pandemic influenza vac5 -
cines has increased  from nearly 800 million doses per annum in 2009,  to 6.372 billion doses 6 7
in 2015 doses per annum at the most recent estimation in 2015.  However, 75% of the global 8
influenza manufacturing capacity is dedicated to meeting the needs of developed states in the 
‘Northern Hemisphere’.  It is therefore unlikely that any increase in manufacturing capacity 9
will have a beneficial effect on pandemic preparedness in developing states, meaning that de-
veloping states will continue to be reliant upon donations from the WHO for access to pan-
demic influenza vaccine. 
Through the PIP Framework the WHO sought to create a more formal method of procure-
ment of vaccines for onward donation to developing states, in order to alleviate some of the 
problems highlighted by 2005-H5N1 and 2009-H1N1 respectively.  The Framework pro10 -
vides obligations and recommendations in two areas: first, the timely sharing of influenza vi-
ral samples with human pandemic potential between member States of the WHO Global In-
fluenza Surveillance and Response System  (GISRS); and second, the sharing of viral sam11 -
ples with entities that operate outside of GISRS, such as pharmaceutical and vaccine manu-
facturers,  in  return  for  these  external  entities  sharing  benefits  with  the  WHO  and  its 
members.  The Framework aims to improve the procurement of PIV by developing states  12 13
by creating a more structured approach to collection and distribution of donated PIV than the 
ad-hoc manner in which the WHO has collected and donated vaccines in previous pandemics. 
This is intended to ensure that the PIV donated by manufactures is not just given on an ad-
hoc basis after orders from fee-paying states have been fulfilled, or once self-procuring states 
have determined they have excess PIV to meet their needs, as was the case with donations 
during  2009-H1N1.  Instead,  donations  of  pandemic  influenza  vaccine  may be  included 14
within the company obligations within Standard Material  Transfer  Agreements  (SMTA)  15
completed via the PIP Framework, which mandate that a proportion of the real-time PIV pro-
duction is reserved for, and transferred to, the PIP stockpile, for onward donation to develop-
ing states.16
The PIP Framework and vaccine procurement
The PIP Framework enables the WHO to manage a stockpile of approximately 150 million 
doses of PIV. This stockpile is created by requiring vaccine manufacturers who receive pan-
demic influenza virus samples from the WHO for vaccine development to contribute to the 
stockpile, via an SMTA. In the event of an influenza pandemic, the WHO will then distribute 
PIV from the stockpile. The Framework provides that
50 million doses of the stockpile will be for use in ‘affected countries, according to 
public health risk and need, to assist in containing the first outbreak or outbreaks of an 
emerging pandemic and 100 million for distribution….to developing countries that 
have no or inadequate access to....influenza vaccines, on a per capita basis that can be 
distributed to affected and at risk developing states during a pandemic.  17
The fact that a stockpile will already be established at the outset of the pandemic, with real-
time commitments from manufactures in place to contribute to the stockpile, should eliminate 
the delay in pledges being fulfilled by donor agencies that were noted during the 2009-H1N1 
outbreak.  Of particular note is the fact that the obligation that PIV manufactures have to 18
contribute vaccine to the PIP stockpile is to be fulfilled at the same time as manufacturers’ 
contractual  commitments  to  self-procuring states,  including those with Advance Purchase 
Agreements in place.  This means that those developing states procuring vaccine from the 19
PIP stockpile will receive their vaccine in the same timeframe as self-procuring states, there-
by ensuring that developing states can vaccinate members of their population earlier in the 
pandemic, which is crucial in reducing disease transmission, and preventing mortality and 
morbidity from a pandemic influenza virus.  The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Frame20 -
work can rightly be described as a ‘milestone for global health’  based solely on the fact that 21
it is the first international agreement that has sought to address inequalities in virus sharing by 
developing states,  and procurement of medical  technologies stemming from such viruses. 
However, closer scrutiny of the terms and conditions the WHO has managed to secure in 
SMTA negotiations makes the Framework appear less impressive.
Within the literature, The Framework has been hailed as an innovative mechanism for guar-
anteeing access to vaccines and affordable life-saving drugs during an influenza pandemic.  22
A number of papers has considered the PIP Framework, and attempted to determine the im-
pact the stockpile it creates will have on procurement of PIV in developing states. In summa-
ry, much of the literature expresses concern that the Framework is unable to make any real 
changes to vaccine allocation due to its inability to close the gap between developed and de-
veloping states where procurement of PIV is concerned  and that the Framework lacks suffi23 -
cient legal powers in order to instigate positive changes to the manner in which developing 
states procure PIV.  These papers considered the benefit sharing provisions of the Standard 24
Material Transfer Agreements, as they were presented in the Appendix of the PIP Framework, 
as at the time, no SMTAs had been concluded with PIV manufacturers.
The major development since these articles were written is the fact that three SMTAs have 
been  concluded  between  the  WHO  and  pandemic  influenza  vaccine  manufacturers.  The 
WHO concluded an SMTA2 with GlaxoSmithKline in December 2012 , the Serum Institute 25
of India in October 2013 , and Sanofi Pasteur in February 2014 . Each of these agreements 26 27
outlines ‘Obligations of the Company’, and it is the content of these obligations which gives 
a clearer indication of the true practical impact the PIP stockpile will have on procurement of 
PIV during the next pandemic. 
PIP commitments 
All vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical manufacturers that use the WHO-GISRS system 
(Use of GISRS’ is understood to include receipt of physical materials, or use of data and/or 
information, some of which may not be routinely provided to the general public ) are under 28
an obligation to make an annual partnership contribution to WHO contributing an amount 
equivalent to 50% of the operational costs of GISRS,  which in 2014 amounted to $26.9mil29 -
lion.  Whilst securing commitments regarding running costs for the WHO-GISRS is clearly 30
beneficial for the WHO, the focus of this research are the provisions of the PIP Framework 
which  will  impact  upon  the  procurement  of  pandemic  influenza  vaccines  by  developing 
states. To this end, pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers who wish to receive PIP bio-
logical materials  by way of a Standard Material Transfer Agreement with the WHO must 31
commit to at least two of the following options
A1. Donate at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production to WHO. 
A2.  Reserve at  least  10% of real  time pandemic vaccine production at  affordable 
prices to WHO. 
A3. Donate at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandem-
ic to WHO. A4. Reserve at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for 
the pandemic at affordable prices. 
A4. Reserve at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandem-
ic at affordable prices.
A5. Grant to manufacturers in developing countries licenses on mutually agreed terms 
that should be fair and reasonable including in respect of affordable royalties, taking 
into account development levels in the country of end use of the products, on technol-
ogy, know-how, products and processes for which it holds IPR for the production of 
(i) influenza vaccines, (ii) adjuvants, (iii) antivirals and/or (iv) diagnostics. 
A6. Grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in developing countries or grant to 
WHO royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses on IPR, which can be sublicensed, for the 
production of pandemic influenza vaccines, adjuvants, antivirals products and diag-
nostics needed in a pandemic. WHO may sublicense these licenses to manufacturers 
in developing countries on appropriate terms and conditions and in accordance with 
sound public health principles.32
These benefit sharing provisions of the Framework have been met with a good deal of sup-
port in the literature, on the basis that they will ensure increased access to vaccines for devel-
oping states during an influenza pandemic.  This support is given on the basis that para33 -
graphs 4.1.A.1 and 4.1.A.2 appear to commit manufacturers to provide at least 10% of their 
real time production to the WHO. However, the above provision has an accompanying foot-
note ‘[r]ecognizing that flexibility is important in negotiating with all manufacturers, in a 
range of 5–20%.’  Despite the fact that the Chair of the PIP negotiations envisioned that 34
SMTAs would be ‘standardised, universal and globally applicable to all transfers of PIP bio-
logical materials and not subject to further negotiation’ , there does appear to be a significant 35
amount of flexibility within the SMTA provided in the Framework. These flexible terms af-
ford PIV manufacturers scope to negotiate terms regarding the donation of vaccines, antivi-
rals, the granting of licenses, and transfer of technology. In addition, the relevant articles on 
liability and indemnities, warranties, duration and termination of contracts, governing law, 
and dispute resolution are not standardised within the Framework and remain simply ‘to be 
agreed by the parties’.36
This is concerning for a number of reasons. Firstly, the fact that so many terms within the 
SMTA need to be agreed upon by the parties is likely to elongate the negotiation process ; 37
and given the fact that influenza pandemics are sporadic in nature, it is not entirely clear to 
what extent such a delay in the negotiations will impact on procurement from the stockpile 
during an influenza pandemic. Secondly, if it is not possible to reach a consensus on all the 
flexible terms, the negotiations will fail, and the SMTA will not enter into force, thereby lead-
ing to fewer vaccines being available for the PIP vaccine stockpile. Moreover, the fact that so 
much of the SMTA is flexible and subject to negotiation will likely provide the manufacturer 
with a stronger negotiating position than the WHO, as the manufacturer will be one of a very 
limited number of providers of a product that is in very high demand, and the WHO will be 
one of a number of potential consumers of such products. 
On the point of such flexible terms included within the SMTA, and the fact that so much of 
the SMTA content remains to be negotiated between the parties, Wilke has expressed the 
view that having WHO lead on such negotiations may actually lead to a more equitable and 
effective outcome for developing states
Unlike before the PIP Framework, when negotiations were conducted on a bilateral 
basis (often involving developing countries), it is the WHO that negotiates the final 
SMTA which introduce further checks and balances, thereby increasing the effective-
ness, and more importantly, the equity.38
The extent to which these compromises in the wording of the standardised SMTA, along with 
flexibilities in the donations of vaccines provisions in the PIP Framework, will have on pro-
curement of PIV by developing states is explored more fully later in this paper. Prior to con-
sidering the content of the SMTAs that have been concluded between the WHO and PIV 
manufacturers, it is necessary to note the low take-up of these agreements amongst PIV man-
ufacturers, as the number of manufacturers with an SMTA will clearly impact upon the effec-
tiveness of the PIP stockpile as a procurement method for developing states.
SMTA uptake amongst manufactures
In the most recent review of PIV manufacturing capacity, Partridge & Kieny (on behalf of the 
WHO) identified twenty-four manufacturers that are active in manufacturing pandemic in-
fluenza vaccines . In addition to this categorisation of influenza manufacturers, the WHO, 39
when calculating partnership contributions for the running costs of GISRS, identifies those 
influenza vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical manufacturers using the WHO GISRS, in 
order for them to contribute to the running costs.  Of those manufacturers identified by Par40 -
tridge & Kieny, eighteen also make partnership contributions to the WHO, on the basis that 
they use the WHO-GISRS . Yet, despite the fact that eighteen active PIV manufactures have 41
been identified as having benefited from the work of GISRS, only three of these manufactures 
have an SMTA in place. 
Prior to the implementation of the PIP Framework Kamradt-Scott & Lee expressed concern 
that requiring PIV manufacturers to make partnership contributions for the running costs of 
GISRS could have the unintended consequence of forcing vaccine manufacturers out of the 
market, and thereby reducing the overall global vaccine capacity
The imposition of what effectively equates to user fees for pharmaceutical companies 
that access GISRS data and samples, either through directly funding the network or 
via commitments to provide at least 10 per cent of vaccines and diagnostics at re-
duced prices, raises the possibility that some manufacturers will exit what has tradi-
tionally been a low-profit industry.42
Whilst it does not appear that manufacturers are actively leaving the market in order to avoid 
making contributions to GISRS as Kamradt-Scott & Lee feared, the fact that so few PIV 
manufacturers have concluded an SMTA appears to suggest that the majority believe they can 
continue PIV production whilst operating outside of the PIP Framework, and GISRS. Pre-
sumably this would be achieved by concluding bilateral agreements with states that have rel-
evant viral samples in their territory, in a similar fashion to the Indonesia-Baxter agreement.  43
Indeed, nothing within the PIP Framework prevents states from transferring viral samples to 
GISRS via an SMTA, and concluding a bilateral agreement with a PIV manufacturer that op-
erates outside of GISRS. It has further been noted that ‘A few manufacturers are using genet-
ic sequence data to make vaccines and other influenza related products ’, a trend that allows 44
manufacturers to make use of data generated via the WHO-GISRS network  but not require 45
access to the viral samples. This would allow them to easily operate within the PIV market 
without being party to an SMTA. This trend is ‘anticipated to increase’ amongst PIV manu-
facturers, due to the anticipated increase in the use of generic sequence data in pandemic in-
fluenza research and development.  Both of these factors are particularly concerning from a 46
procurement  of  PIV perspective  as  manufacturers,  by  avoiding  the  need  to  conclude  an 
SMTA in order to gain viral samples, also avoid any obligations to contribute to the stockpile 
that PIP manages, which will reduce as a direct consequence. 
SMTA commitments by manufacturers
With regard to the PIV manufacturers that have concluded an SMTA, the WHO uses a formu-
la based upon the average annual influenza product sales per manufacturer, for the three past 
years, plus the most recent pandemic year when determining contributions towards the run-
ning costs of GISRS.  On this basis, Sanofi Pasteur and GSK are the two largest PIV manu47 -
factures in the world by sales value , and the Serum Institute of India is the tenth largest, out 48
of the eighteen PIV manufacturers that contribute to GISRS. Had these three manufacturers 
committed to donate 10% of their production capacity to the stockpile, (as the standardised 
SMTA provided at Annex 2) based on the company’s most recent estimates of production ca-
pacity for pandemic influenza vaccines , this would amount to donations to the stockpile of 49
63.4 million doses of PIV, which is under half the amount of vaccine that the Framework was 
meant to raise. Moreover, considering the fact that two-thirds of this amount is to be allocated 
to developing countries on a per capita basis, this pledge would have covered approximately 
1.4% of affected developing state’s populations, if a one-dose regime would suffice.  In the 50
event of a two-dose regime being necessary, population coverage from PIP donations within 
developing states would have dropped to 0.7%. 
However, despite the fact that the standardised SMTA provided at Annex 2 provides that 
manufacturers of vaccines in receipt of viral samples from WHO-GISRS should donate at 
least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production to WHO , those SMTAs that have been 51
concluded have industry commitments which are lower than this 10%. GSK has committed to 
‘donate 7.5% of real-time pandemic influenza vaccines to the WHO’ and ‘reserve 2.5%....at 
affordable price to WHO’ . Sanofi has committed to donate 7.5% to WHO, and reserve an 52
additional 7.5% at affordable purchase for purchase by WHO, and the Serum institute of In-
dia has committed to donate 8% of real-time production, and reserve 2% for purchase by the 
WHO. As the below table demonstrates, this means that the three manufacturers have com-
mitted to donate just under 48 million doses to the stockpile, a 25% decrease on the commit-
ments provided in the example SMTA in the Framework, and over 100 million doses fewer 
than the Framework was intended to manage. The WHO has the option to purchase an addi-
tional 28 million doses at ‘affordable prices’. 
Table 1. Comparison of Commitments provided in example SMTA, with those provided in the 
signed Agreements
Example 
SMTA: Dona-
tions 
SMTA Commit-
ments: Donations
SMTA Commit-
ments: Purchase
Sanofi 25 18.75 18.75
GSK 34 25 8.35
Serum 5 4 1
Total 
(million) 64 47.75 28.1
Such reductions in the obligations placed upon manufacturers that  have SMTAs with the 
WHO  significantly  reduces  the  vaccination  coverage  within  developing  states  using  the 
stockpile as a procurement method. Based on the current production capacity of those manu-
facturers with an SMTA, 0.8% of the population of developing states could be vaccinated 
from the PIP Stockpile, based on the donation commitments contained within the enforceable 
SMTAs. This represents a 24% reduction in vaccination coverage when compared with the 
example commitments provided within the PIP Framework SMTA. Vaccination coverage in-
creases to 1.26% if WHO purchases all those vaccines which are reserved by the manufactur-
ers for purchase by the WHO.  These vaccination coverage figures assume that that a one-
dose strategy will suffice. If a two-dose vaccination strategy is required, vaccination coverage 
levels will halve.
The suitability of procurement via donations (making use of the PIP Framework) as a viable 
procurement method for developing states has actually reduced since the use of the VDI dur-
ing 2009-H1N1, due to the low number of doses secured on behalf of the PIP stockpile. The 
stockpile the WHO managed during 2009-H1N1 distributed 78 million doses to the ninety-
seven developing states that lacked domestic vaccine production and lacked the ability to 
purchase vaccine on the commercial market , whereas the PIP stockpile has firm commit53 -
ments to receive donations of 47.75million donations, and the option to purchase an addition-
al 28 million doses. However, not all of this stockpile is reserved specifically for developing 
states that are unable to procure PIV on the open market. If the WHO maintains the propor-
tions at which it intended to distribute the donated vaccine with 
One-third to ‘for use in affected countries, according to public health risk and need, to 
assist in containing the first outbreak or outbreaks of an emerging pandemic’, two-
thirds to ‘developing countries that have no or inadequate access to H5N1 influenza 
vaccines, on a per capita basis, with use to be determined by those countries.54
Only 31.8 million of those doses will be available to be procured by developing states that 
have no or inadequate access. 
The shortcomings of the PIP stockpile as a procurement method for developing states are 
more clearly demonstrated with reference to vaccination coverage within developing states. 
The current PIP stockpile has 46 million doses committed to it, giving coverage of 0.76% on 
a one-dose strategy, and 0.38% on a two-dose, which is well below the vaccination coverage 
the VDI donations managed during 2009-H1N1, and significantly below the target of 33% 
needed to establish herd immunity within a population. While the PIP Stockpile was not ex-
plicitly created with the 33% vaccination target in mind (nowhere in the drafting or the final 
text was a vaccination coverage target set) the herd immunity level of 33% a minimum vac-
cination coverage of at least 33% has been required in all pandemics in order to establish 
community immunity and slow down the rate of infection  In relation to this target, clearly, 55
the commitments provided in the example SMTA do not make procurement from the PIP 
stockpile a particularly attractive procurement option for developing states, particularly if a 
developing state is seeking to procure sufficient vaccine in order to establish herd immunity 
levels within their territory.
When comparing procurement of PIV from the PIP stockpile, with the procurement of PIV 
from the Vaccine Deployment Initiative stockpile the WHO created during 2009-H1N1, it is 
clear that the one major benefit of the PIP stockpile is the removal of the time delay of donat-
ed vaccine being committed to the WHO.  Despite this apparent benefit, concern has been 56
expressed by the industry that during an influenza pandemic, member states with domestic 
PIV production within their territory would place restrictions upon exports of PIV that have 
been committed to the PIP stockpile, until domestic demand had been fulfilled.  This con57 -
cern appears to be well founded, many developing states procured less vaccine, and procured 
it later, than their developed neighbours during 2009-H1N1.  One reason noted for this was 58
that governments of developed states with domestic manufacturing capacity (that would have 
benefited from virus sharing by developing states) restricted exports to other territories until 
domestic demand had been fulfilled.  As Fidler noted 59
Canada awarded its vaccine contract to a Canadian company because it feared that 
foreign governments might restrict exports to Canada because of vaccine shortages 
within their  territories.  The Australian government made it  clear  to the Australian 
manufacturer CSL that it must fulfil the government’s domestic needs before export-
ing vaccine to the United States. The United States [stated that the US] would not do-
nate H1N1 vaccine as promised until all at risk Americans had access, because pro-
duction problems had created shortages in the United States.60
While the WHO Director-General is seeking periodic assurances from Member States that 
they would enable companies to fulfil their SMTA commitments to supply pandemic vaccine 
to WHO on a real-time basis  it is not yet apparent if these assurances will be given by 61
Member States, or indeed, even if they are given, whether they will be honoured during a fu-
ture pandemic. The Director-General appears keen to obtain such assurances as the problem 
of governments of developed states with domestic manufacturing capacity being able to pre-
vent the export of PIVs to the WHO or developing states until domestic demand has been sat-
isfied has not been resolved by the PIP Framework. Article 14 of the SMTAs signed with PIV 
manufacturers states that ‘no Party shall be liable for any delay in the performance of or fail-
ure to perform its obligations under this Agreement, where such a delay or failure is caused 
by Force Majeure’,  and the definition provided for ‘Force Majeure’ includes ‘….embargo or 62
requisition’ and ‘acts of government’ , meaning that the PIP Framework does not prevent the 63
nationalisation of pandemic influenza vaccination manufacturing, or the embargo or requisi-
tion of vaccinations by states with domestic manufacturing in their territory. Such an embargo 
or requisition occurring could have a significant impact on the viability of the PIP Stockpile 
by reducing the number of vaccines the Stockpile has to distribute, or by causing a significant 
delay in the delivery of the vaccines to the Stockpile, and onward transfer to recipient states. 
This suggests that it is unlikely the PIP Framework will have, in practice, a significant posi-
tive impact on the procurement of PIVs by developing states, or indeed, that the Framework 
has done anything to change the status quo that exists between developed and developing 
states during an influenza pandemic. 
The low uptake of SMTAs amongst PIV manufacturers, combined with the reduced commit-
ments being given by PIV manufacturers in those SMTAs that have been concluded, make 
the PIP stockpile a particularly undesirable procurement method for developing states. More-
over, even when all of the vaccine that has been committed to the WHO via SMTAs has been 
delivered, it is likely that the WHO will need to seek donations from PIV manufacturers (out-
side of SMTA commitments) and developed states, in order to be able to fulfil the procure-
ment needs of developing states, in much the same way they did during 2009-H1N1. This is a 
particularly  undesirable  scenario  because,  when  making  appeals  for  donated  vaccine  the 
WHO will again have ‘little leverage to influence developed countries [and PIV manufactur-
ers] other than rhetoric about equity, justice, and solidarity’ . If the WHO must again make 64
appeals to equity and justice in order to procure vaccine to donate to developing states, as ap-
pears likely, it will highlight the significant shortcomings in the PIP Framework, which was 
designed specifically to minimise such a scenario during a pandemic.  
This section has demonstrated that direct procurement from the PIP stockpile is not a viable 
option for developing states seeking to increase their access to pandemic influenza vaccines. 
Whilst  procurement  from the PIP Stockpile  does have one distinct  benefit:  if  developing 
states were to procure vaccines from the PIP Stockpile, then these vaccine would be dis-
tributed within the same timeframe as developed states.  Whilst this is a clear benefit over 65
procurement of the VDI during 2009-H1N1, relying upon the PIP Stockpile will not allow 
developing states to procure sufficient levels of vaccine on behalf of their population. Indeed, 
on the point of vaccination levels, it would appear that procurement from the PIP Framework 
will lead to lower vaccination levels in developing states, than procurement from the VDI 
did, unless the WHO can procure significantly more vaccines for onward donation to devel-
oping states by making use of ‘rhetoric about equity, justice, and solidarity’ in order to re-
quest donations from developed states and influenza manufacturers.
In addition to creating a stockpile for direct procurement, the PIP Framework also attempts to 
increase transfer of technology from established PIV manufacturers in developed states, to 
new manufacturers in developing states. Transfer of technology, if properly managed, can 
also improve the procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines by developing states. Transfer 
of technology can create a situation whereby developing states are able to contract with pan-
demic influenza vaccine manufacturers based in their own territory (possibly by way of an 
Advance Purchase Agreement), as opposed to being reliant upon the established manufactur-
ers based in developed states. This would allow developing states to have rapid access to 
pandemic influenza vaccines, and would eliminate the risk of developed states with pandemic 
influenza vaccine manufacturers based in their territory restricting exports of vaccines until 
domestic demand has been fulfilled during a pandemic. 
Transfer of technology and vaccine procurement
The importance of developing states having some degree of self-sufficiency in pandemic in-
fluenza vaccine procurement, by contracting with pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers 
based in their own territory, as opposed to being reliant upon the established manufacturers 
based in developed states, was highlighted in a paper by Friede et al, in which they noted that
In 2006, 90% of influenza vaccine production was located in nine countries (largely in 
Europe and North America) that represented only 10% of the global population. Other 
countries, notably those in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, could witness a stagger-
ing death toll and a severe strain on their health services while waiting for producing 
countries and regions to have vaccinated their own populations.  66
While pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturing capacity has increases since 2006, the pro-
portions by which this capacity is divided between developing and developed states has re-
mained largely the same, with capacity in developing states still being significantly lower 
than that which is required in order to adequately immunise the populations of developing 
states.  Therefore there is a clear need for developing states, either standing alone or as part 67
of regional groups, to move towards self-sufficient procurement of pandemic influenza vac-
cines.  In  order  to  do  so,  manufacturers  based  in  developing  states  require  access  to 
specific technical knowledge that cannot be inferred from the patent, and is not available in 
the public domain, in order to manufacture a pandemic influenza vaccine. In the case of pan-
demic influenza vaccines, it has been noted that
[t]he technical know-how − even of conventional egg-derived influenza vaccines − is 
not readily found outside existing influenza vaccine production plants. Thus, even for 
procedures for which there are no patents, securing working partnerships with tech-
nology holders may be necessary.68
Without access to such technical knowledge, developing states, or manufacturers in develop-
ing states, are unable to manufacture their own PIV as a method of procurement. Transfer of 
technology leading to increased self-procurement from domestic manufacturers is arguably 
the most effective manner by which developing states can sustainably and effectively procure 
sufficient doses of pandemic influenza vaccines, in an appropriate timeframe, during a pan-
demic. To this end, at a policy level, the World Health Organisation has often encouraged 
transfer of technology from established manufacturers of pandemic influenza vaccines to new 
manufacturers in developing states, in order to improve pandemic preparedness within devel-
oping states. In the wake of growing concerns over the H5N1 strain of pandemic influenza in 
late 2005, the World Health Assembly passed Resolution WHA58.5, which focused upon 
strengthening  pandemic  influenza  preparedness  and  response .  Resolution  WHA58.5  re69 -
quired the Director-General to
continue to develop WHOs plans and capacity to respond to an influenza pandemic, to 
be able to provide technical support, capacity building and technology transfer related 
to H5N1 influenza vaccines and diagnostics to developing countries.70
While not specifically related to pandemic influenza vaccines, the next major policy devel-
opment at the WHO regarding transfer of technology in order to improve access to and the 
procurement of medicines was the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, In-
novation and Intellectual Property (GSPA-PHI) in 2008. The GSPA-PHI was ‘designed to 
promote innovation, build capacity [and] improve access to medicines,  and aimed to ‘pro71 -
mote new thinking on innovation and access to medicine’, as well as ‘provide a medium term 
framework for securing an enhanced and sustainable basis for needs driven essential health 
research  and  development  relevant  to  diseases  which  disproportionally  affect  developing 
countries’.  72
GSPA-PHI aimed to promote transfer of technology and the production of health products in 
developing countries by
(a) exploring ‘possible new mechanisms and make better use of existing mechanisms 
to facilitate transfer of technology and technical support to build and improve innova-
tive capacity for health-related research and development, particularly in developing 
countries’;
(b) promoting ‘transfer of technology and production of health products in developing 
countries through investment and capacity building’; and
(c) promoting ‘transfer of technology and production of health products in developing 
countries through identification of best practices, and investment and capacity build-
ing provided by developed and developing countries where appropriate.73
In relation to pandemic influenza vaccines, this policy of promoting transfer of technology to 
developing state manufacturers was largely facilitated though the WHO Influenza Vaccine 
Technology Transfer Initiative, a collaborative project between the WHO, some developed 
states and PIV manufactures. The Influenza Vaccine Technology Transfer Initiative aimed to 
create regionally based, independent, and sustainable pandemic influenza vaccine production 
capacity in developing countries, through financial support and technology transfer to manu-
facturers in developing states.  Transfer of technology through the Influenza Vaccine Tech74 -
nology Transfer Initiative was facilitated through the creation of a ‘hub’ for the transfer of 
influenza vaccine technology. The Hub is a platform for transferring a complete manufactur-
ing process at ‘pilot scale’ to a new manufacturer in a developing state by granting a non-ex-
clusive license for use of the technology, along with providing information and training on 
using the technology, along with relevant safety and efficacy data, which allows the recipient 
to make use of a shortened regulatory pathway for licensing the PIV.75
The WHO Hub was launched in 2007 and, to date, vaccine manufacturers in seventeen de-
veloping states have received financial grants, and technical knowledge and understanding 
from the hub, which has enabled them to produce pandemic influenza vaccine.   Despite this 76
success, it is reported that the WHO are concerned that ‘there is a great lack of interested 
technology providers’ wishing to contribute to the Hub ; meaning that the Hub is limited in 77
the amount, or level, of technology available to it to be transferred. The role of the technolo-
gy provider is obviously key to the success of the hub model, as the ‘model can only be used 
with vaccines for which no intellectual property barriers exist in both the country hosting the 
hub and the country receiving the technology’.  Therefore the active engagement of  the 78
technology holder to grant a license that effectively removes these barriers in host and recip-
rocal states, as well as providing the technology and know-how, is key to the success of the 
hub model. The result of this lack of interest from technology providers to provide new and 
updated technology to the hub is that recipient manufacturers are unlikely to benefit from any 
of the scientific advances which occur in the field of pandemic influenza vaccines. The im-
pact of this is that the pandemic influenza vaccines produced by recipient manufactures will 
not be as effective, or produced in as efficient a manner, as the vaccine produced by estab-
lished manufacturers in developed states. 
Transfer of technology provisions and the PIP Framework
One of the most notable omissions from the SMTAs that have been signed with PIV manu-
factures is that none of the agreements currently in place has secured any commitments from 
manufacturers regarding transfer of technology.  This is despite the fact that during the nego79 -
tiations of the PIP Framework, the importance of transfer of technology for pandemic pre-
paredness and procurement was stressed in the reports of the Advisory Group on Pandemic 
influenza at the WHO and the WHO Director-General, which were integral to the develop-
ment of the Framework. The Director-General noted that: ‘Preparedness requires long-term 
investment,  particularly  when  capacity  building  requires  training  and  transfer  of 
knowledge’  whereas the Group stressed the need to achieve the greatest impact by building 80
capacity in states where it is lowest and observed that preparedness requires long-term in-
vestment, particularly when capacity building requires training and transfer of knowledge . 81
Facilitating the transfer of technology from established PIV manufacturers to manufacturers 
in developing states is one of the clear aims of the PIP Framework. Paragraph 6.0.2(iv) states 
that ‘the PIP Benefit Sharing System will operate to: build capacity in receiving countries 
over time for and through technical assistance and transfer of technology, skills and know-
how and  expanded  influenza  vaccine  production,  tailored  to  their  public  health  risk  and 
needs’ . Further detail on the WHO’s vision for transfer of technology via PIP is provided at 82
4.6.1-4.6.2, which states that
The Director-General will continue to work closely with Member States and influenza 
vaccine  manufacturers  to  implement  the  WHO Global  Pandemic Influenza Action 
Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply, including its strategies to build new production facil-
ities in developing and/or industrialized countries and through transfer of technology, 
skills and know-how.
Member States should urge influenza vaccine, diagnostic and pharmaceutical manu-
facturers to make specific efforts to transfer these technologies to other countries, par-
ticularly developing countries, as appropriate.
Influenza vaccine manufacturers who receive PIP biological materials may grant, sub-
ject to any existing licensing restrictions, on mutually agreed terms, a non-exclusive, 
royalty-free license to any influenza vaccine manufacturer from a developing country, 
to use its intellectual property and other protected substances, products, technology, 
know-how, information and knowledge used in the process of influenza vaccine de-
velopment and production, in particular for pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines for 
use in agreed developing countries.83
It is clear that the WHO views increasing transfer of technology as an integral part of the plan 
to increase access to pandemic influenza vaccines and reduce the inequality between develop-
ing and developed states on this issue, therefore it is necessary to determine to what extent 
transfer of technology provisions have been incorporated into the PIP Framework. This is 
particularly relevant as the PIP Framework has been hailed as a ‘landmark in global gover-
nance for health, representing the first international agreement on influenza virus and benefit 
sharing’ , it represents an ideal opportunity to increase transfer of technology to developing 84
states manufacturers. However, despite the clear impetus within the WHO, both at a policy 
level, and in the development of the PIP Framework, the resulting obligations which were 
placed upon manufacturers in regard to transfer of technology via the PIP Framework appear 
particularly weak. 
Within the ‘Obligations of the Company’ in the standardised SMTA provided in the Annex of 
the PIP Framework , the transfer of technology related provisions state that manufacturers of 
vaccines and/or antivirals can commit to
A5. Grant to manufacturers in developing countries licenses on mutually agreed terms 
that should be fair and reasonable including in respect of affordable royalties, taking 
into account development levels in the country of end use of the products, on technol-
ogy, know-how, products and processes for which it holds IPR for the production of 
(i) influenza vaccines, (ii) adjuvants, (iii) antivirals and/or (iv) diagnostics  85
and/or: 
A6. Grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in developing countries or grant to 
WHO royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses on IPR, which can be sublicensed, for the 
production of pandemic influenza vaccines, adjuvants, antivirals products and diag-
nostics needed in a pandemic. WHO may sublicense these licenses to manufacturers 
in developing countries on appropriate terms and conditions and in accordance with 
sound public health principles.86
It seems bizarre that the WHO at a policy level, and within the aims of the PIP Framework, 
stressed the importance of transfer of technology for pandemic preparedness and procure-
ment, and yet the relevant provisions addressing transfer of technology within the SMTA are 
so weak. There is a number of elements concerned with transfer of technology within these 
SMTA that are particularly concerning. Firstly, it seems unusual that, in creating the Frame-
work, the WHO have chosen not to expressly link together the work of the WHO Influenza 
Vaccine Hub, and the PIP Framework. While Paragraph A.6 does provide the technology 
holder with the option to grant royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses on intellectual property 
rights to the WHO, who can then sublicensed these rights to manufacturers in developing 
states, it makes no reference to the transfer of technical knowhow required to work the inven-
tion covered by these intellectual property rights also being transferred to the WHO.  This is 
concerning because it is not merely the intellectual property rights which pose a significant 
barrier to developing states being able to establish pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturing 
in their territory. While intellectual property rights can be a barrier to manufacturers in devel-
oping states establishing manufacturing capacity, it is the lack of technical knowhow amongst 
prospective manufacturers in developing states that has clearly been identified as the barrier 
to self-sufficient procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines by developing states.87
Instead, PIV manufacturers that choose to engage with transfer of technology as part of their 
‘Company Obligations’ are compelled only to transfer technology to a non-specific number of 
manufacturers in developing states, meaning the knowledge will only be transferred to a lim-
ited number of entities, at the technology holder’s discretion. Technology transfer which oc-
curs on a bilateral basis between an established manufacturer acting as donor to a new manu-
facturer in a developing state has been noted as being ‘not readily feasible in cases where 
there is limited financial benefit for donor’ in the context of pandemic influenza vaccines.  88
Therefore  it  is  particularly  concerning that  this  is  the  only transfer  of  technology option 
which is available as an ‘Obligation of the Company’ within an SMTA. Transfer of technolo-
gy via the PIP Framework could have had significantly greater impact if the technology hold-
er were compelled to transfer their knowledge to the WHO Influenza Vaccine Hub, along 
with the right for the hub to transfer this knowledge on again, to multiple relevant manufac-
turers in developing states. This would ensure maximum distribution of relevant technical 
knowledge, which in turn would help build pandemic preparedness by increasing vaccine 
manufacturing capacity in developing states. 
In addition to the above, the wording in each of the transfer of technology provisions in the 
SMTA provisions is too vague. As noted above, if transfer of technology is to occur on a bi-
lateral basis from one manufacturer to another, this will only occur when it is financially vi-
able for the donor. The wording of paragraph A.5 specifies neither the number of recipient 
manufacturers, not the number of recipient developing states that are to receive transferred 
technology in order to comply with the obligation. This is seemingly left to the PIV manufac-
turer transferring the technology to decide. Moreover, the wording ‘terms that should be fair 
and reasonable’ is again particularly subjective, with both ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ not being 
defined within the Framework, again, leaving it open to the interpretation of donor manufac-
turers. The vague wording of the transfer of technology related provisions within the SMTAs, 
particularly in relation to key terms, will inevitably lead to inconsistencies in the amount of 
technology transfer that will occur, and the terms of the transfer. This may lead to donor 
manufacturers determining that ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ has a particularly low threshold, and 
therefore, they are only obligation to undertake minimal transfer in order to meet this re-
quirement.   Whilst it may be the case that some particularly benevolent manufacturer will 
transfer more technology than is deemed ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’ to a state, this will lead to an 
inequitable situation whereby some developing states have benefited significantly more than 
other recipient states. 
Transfer of technology from an established pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturer to a 
new manufacturer in a developing states has been encouraged by the WHO through its policy 
initiatives, on the basis that it is not patents but access to knowledge that constitutes the most 
significant barrier for new manufacturers to begin pandemic influenza vaccine production. To 
this end, the WHO has seen some limited success in transferring technology related to the 
pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturing process from established manufacturers, to new 
ones. Despite this, and the fact that the PIP Framework represented a major opportunity for 
the WHO to strengthen the transfer of technology, it is clear that the WHO missed this oppor-
tunity. 
None of  the  pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers  that  have an SMTA in force  has 
committed to transfer technology to the WHO as part of its company obligations. However, 
even if any manufacturer had committed to this, the transfer of technology related provisions 
contained within the Framework are too weak to have any real positive impact on the manner 
in which developing states can establish PIV manufacturing capacity within their territory, in 
order to achieve the sufficient access which is. This is a key failing of the Framework, as it is 
this ability to establish manufacturing capacity which looks to be the most suitable method to 
provide developing states with a sustainable and effective method of pandemic influenza vac-
cine procurement. Transfer of technology, along with the removal of intellectual property re-
lated barriers to production, is key to this being possible.
Conclusion 
While the relevant academic literature has praised the PIP Framework as being an innovative 
model mechanism for guaranteeing access to vaccines and affordable life-saving drugs,  this 89
paper has argued that such praise appears to be misplaced. Indeed, while, the PIP Framework 
does provide one clear benefit to developing states that procure from it, in that those states 
that procure vaccine from the PIP Framework procure them in the same timeframe as self-
procuring developed states. However, it is clear that the Framework is not appropriate tool by 
which developing states could procure enough vaccines to meet their public health needs.
Three predominant reasons for this can be identified. In the first instance, the provisions with-
in  the  example  Standard  Material  Transfer  Agreement  provided  at  the  annex  to  the  PIP 
Framework fail to maximise benefit sharing for developing states, largely due to the overly 
flexible benefit sharing obligations secured in the PIP Framework, and the lack of legal com-
pulsion that requires relevant PIV manufacturers to commit to benefit sharing via a Standard 
Material  Transfer  Agreement.  Secondly,  the  prospect  of  developing  states  using  the  PIP 
Stockpile as a procurement tool becomes even less viable when the SMTAs that pandemic 
influenza vaccine manufacturers have signed are taken into consideration. Too few of the 
pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers currently active within the market have committed 
to share benefits with the WHO via an SMTA, with only 17% of manufacturers currently par-
ty to an SMTA. This clearly impacts undesirably on the number of doses which the PIP 
Stockpile has available to it for distribution to developing states that have been unable to pro-
cure vaccine via self-procurement methods. Thirdly, the viability of the PIP Stockpile as a 
procurement method is further reduced when the terms which have been secured with the 
three manufacturers that are party to a SMTA are evaluated.
Whilst the PIP Framework already contains provisions intended to improve transfer of tech-
nology from technology holders to developing states wishing to be in receipt of said technol-
ogy, via SMTA2 Agreements, there is little incentive for technology holders to engage with 
SMTA2 generally, and even less incentive to engage with the specific transfer of technology 
provisions within the SMTAs. In respect of future reforms, it would be beneficial if the WHO 
tailored the PIP Framework, and the resulting SMTAs to facilitate transfer of technology and 
knowhow from vaccine manufacturers, to developing states, in order for developing states to 
become self-sufficient in their procurement of pandemic influenza vaccines. That is, to manu-
facture (either alone or in regional groups) sufficient levels of pandemic influenza vaccines in 
order to achieve herd immunity, without being reliant upon procurement from established 
pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturers in developed states, or receiving donations from 
the WHO - as these are demonstrably not viable options for developing states. 
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